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Abstract—The email system is the central battleground against
phishing and social engineering attacks, and yet email providers
still face key challenges to authenticate incoming emails. As a
result, attackers can apply spoofing techniques to impersonate
a trusted entity to conduct highly deceptive phishing attacks. In
this work, we study email spoofing to answer three key questions:
(1) How do email providers detect and handle forged emails? (2)
Under what conditions can forged emails penetrate the defense
to reach user inbox? (3) Once the forged email gets in, how email
providers warn users? Is the warning truly effective?
We answer these questions through end-to-end measurements
on 35 popular email providers (used by billions of users), and
extensive user studies (N = 913) that consist of both simulated
and real-world phishing experiments. We have four key findings.
First, most popular email providers have the necessary protocols
to detect spoofing, but still allow forged emails to get into
user inbox (e.g., Yahoo Mail, iCloud, Gmail). Second, once a
forged email gets in, most email providers have no warnings for
users, particularly on mobile email apps. Some providers (e.g.,
Gmail Inbox) even have misleading UIs that make the forged
email look authentic. Third, a few email providers (9/35) have
implemented visual security cues for unverified emails, which
demonstrate a positive impact to reduce risky user actions.
Comparing simulated experiments with realistic phishing tests,
we observe that the impact of security cue is less significant when
users are caught off guard in the real-world setting.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the recent development of system and network
security, human factors still remain the weak link. As a result,
attackers increasingly rely on phishing and social engineering
tactics to breach their targeted networks. In 2016 alone,
email phishing has involved in nearly half of the 2000+
reported security breaches, causing a leakage of billions of
user records [3], [61].
Email spoofing is a critical step in phishing, where the
attacker impersonates a trusted entity to gain the victim’s trust.
Unfortunately, today’s email transmission protocol (SMTP)
has no built-in mechanism to prevent spoofing [54]. It relies
on email providers to implement SMTP extensions such as
SPF [38], DKIM [18] and DMARC [49] to authenticate the
sender. Since implementing these extensions is voluntary, their
adoption rate is far from satisfying. Recent measurements
conducted in 2015 show that among Alexa top 1 million
domains, 40% have SPF, 1% have DMARC, and even fewer
are correctly/strictly configured [22], [26].
The limited server-side protection is likely to put users in
a vulnerable position. Because not every sender domain has
adopted SPF/DKIM/DMARC, email providers still face key
challenges to reliably authenticate incoming emails. When an
email failed the authentication, it is a “blackbox” process in
terms of how email providers handle this email. Would forged
emails still be delivered to users? If so, how could users know
the email is questionable? Take Gmail for example, Gmail
delivers certain forged emails to the inbox and places a security
cue on the sender icon (a red question mark, Figure 4(a)).
We are curious about how a broader range of email providers
handle forged emails, and how much the security cues actually
help to protect users.
In this paper, we describe our efforts and experience in eval-
uating the effectiveness of user-level protections against email
spoofing1. We answer the above questions in two key steps.
First, we examine how popular email providers detect and han-
dle forged emails using end-to-end measurements. Particularly,
we examine under what conditions can forged/phishing emails
reach the user inbox and what security cues (if any) are used
to warn users. Second, we measure the impact of the security
cues on users through a series of user studies (N = 913). To
obtain reliable experiment results, we conduct both simulated
and real-world phishing experiments.
Measurements. By scanning Alexa top 1 million hosts in
January and October 2017, we confirm that the adoption rate
of SMTP security extensions is still low (SPF 45.0%, DMARC
4.6%). This motivates us to examine how email providers
handle incoming emails that failed the authentication. We
conduct end-to-end spoofing experiments on 35 popular public
email providers used by billions of users. We treat each email
provider as a blackbox and vary the input (forged emails) to
monitor the output (the receiver’s inbox).
We find that forged emails can penetrate the majority of
email providers (33/35) including Gmail, Yahoo Mail and
Apple iCloud under proper conditions. Even if the receiver
performs all the authentication checks (SPF, DKIM, DMARC),
spoofing an unprotected domain or a domain with “weak”
DMARC policies can help the forged email to reach the inbox.
In addition, spoofing an “existing contact” of the victim also
helps the attacker to penetrate email providers (e.g., Hotmail).
Overall, the result indicates that providers tend to prioritize
email delivery when the email cannot be reliably authenticated.
More surprisingly, while most providers allow forged emails
to get in, rarely do they warn users of the unverified sender.
Only 9 of 35 providers have implemented some security cues:
8 providers have security cues on their web interface (e.g.,
Gmail) and only 4 providers (e.g., Naver) have the security
cues consistently for the mobile apps. Even worse, certain
email providers have misleading UI elements which help the
attacker to make forged emails look authentic. For example,
when attackers spoof an existing contact (or a user from the
1Our study has been reviewed and approved by our local IRB (IRB-17-397).
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same provider), 25 out of 35 providers will automatically
load either the sender’s profile photo, name card or email
history from their internal database for this forged email. These
designs are supposed to improve email usability by providing
the context on “who sent this email”. However, when the
sender address is actually spoofed, these designs, in turn, help
the attacker with the deception.
User Studies. While a handful of email providers have
implemented security cues, the real question is how effective
they are. We answer this question using a series of user studies
(N = 913) where participants examine spoofed phishing
emails with or without security cues on the interface. Our
methodology follows a hybrid approach. First, we conducted
a “role-playing” where users examine phishing and benign
emails in a controlled hypothetical scenario. While the role-
playing method is widely used for usability studies [52], [59],
[63], [65], [67], our concern is that certain artificial conditions
may affect the user behavior. To this end, we also run a real-
world phishing test to validate our results.
Our result shows that security cues have a positive impact on
reducing risky user actions consistently across the role-playing
experiment and the real-world phishing test. The impact is also
consistently positive for users of different demographics (age,
gender, education-level). In addition, comparing with the role-
playing setting, we find that the impact of security cues in the
real-world setting is not as significant when users are caught
off guard. The result indicates that the security cue is useful
but cannot eliminate the phishing risk. The design of security
cue also should be further improved to maximize its impact.
Contributions. Our work has three key contributions:
• First, our end-to-end measurement sheds light on how
email providers handle forged emails. We reveal the
trade-offs made by different email providers between
email availability and security.
• Second, we are the first to empirically analyze the usage
of security cues on spoofed emails. We show that most
email providers not only lack the necessary security cues
(particularly on mobile apps), but introduce misleading
UIs that in turn help the attackers.
• Third, we conduct extensive user studies to evaluate the
effectiveness of the security cue. We demonstrate its
positive impact (and potential problems) using both role-
playing experiments and real-world phishing tests.
II. BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY
Today’s email system is built upon the SMTP protocol,
which was initially designed without security in mind. Security
extensions were introduced later to provide confidentiality,
integrity, and authenticity. In this paper, we primarily focus on
email authenticity, a property that is often abused by phishing
attacks. Below, we briefly introduce SMTP and related security
extensions. Then we discuss the key challenges to defend
against email spoofing and introduce our research questions
and methodology.
Fig. 1. Email transmission from Alex to Bob.
A. SMTP and Email Spoofing
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is an Internet stan-
dard for electronic mail transmission [54]. Figure 1 shows the
three main steps to deliver an email message. (¶) Starting
from the sender’s Mail User Agent (MUA), the message is
first transmitted to the Mail Submission Agent (MSA) of the
sender’s service provider via STMP or even HTTP/HTTPS.
(·) Then the sender’s Mail Transfer Agent (MTA) sends the
message to the receiver’s email provider using SMTP. (¸)
After processing, the message is delivered to the receiving
user by the Mail Delivery Agent (MDA) via Internet Message
Access Protocol (IMAP), Post Office Protocol (POP) or even
HTTP/HTTPS.
When initially designed, SMTP did not have any security
mechanisms to authenticate the sender identity. As a result,
attackers can easily craft a forged email to impersonate/spoof
an arbitrary sender address by modifying the “MAIL FROM”
field in SMTP. Email spoofing is a critical step in a phishing
attack — by impersonating a trusted entity as the email sender,
the attacker has a higher chance to gain the victim’s trust. In
practice, attackers usually exploit SMTP in step (·) by setting
up their own MTA server.
B. Email Authentication
To provide security for the email system, various security
extensions have been proposed and standardized. Here, we
briefly describe the extensions that are designed to support
email authenticity and prevent spoofing (e.g., SPF, DKIM and
DMARC). There are other security extensions that provide
confidentiality and integrity (e.g., STARTTLS), which are
beyond the scope of this paper.
SPF. Sender Policy Framework (SPF) allows an email
service (or an organization) to publish a list of IPs that are
authorized to send emails for its domain (RFC7208 [38]).
For example, if a domain “a.com” published its SPF
record in the DNS, then other email services can check
this record when receiving an email that claims to be from
“{someone}@a.com”. In this way, only authorized IPs can
send emails as “a.com”. SPF makes it convenient for an
organization to use third-party/cloud-based email providers
by simply adding the provider’s IP range to the SPF record.
In addition, SPF allows the organization to specify a policy
regarding how the receiver should handle the email that failed
the authentication.
DKIM. DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) uses the
public-key based approach to authenticate the email sender
(RFC6376 [18]). The sender’s email service will place a
digital signature in the email header signed by the private
key associated to the sender’s domain. The receiving service
can retrieve the sender’s public key from DNS to verify the
signature. In order to query a DKIM public key from DNS,
one not only needs the domain name but also a selector (an
attribute in the DKIM signature). Selectors are used to permit
multiple keys under the same domain for more a fine-grained
signatory control. DKIM does not specify what actions that
the receiver should take if the authentication fails.
DMARC. Domain-based Message Authentication, Report-
ing and Conformance (DMARC) is built on top of SPF and
DKIM (RFC7489 [49]). DMARC is not a standalone protocol.
It allows the domain administrative owner to publish a policy
to specify what actions the receiver should take when the
incoming email fails the SPF and DKIM check. A domain’s
DMARC record is available under _dmarc.domain.com in
DNS. Another protocol called ADSP (Author Domain Signing
Practices) also allows domain owners to publish DKIM signing
policies, but ADSP was declared “historic” in 2013 [46].
C. Practical Challenges to Prevent Spoofing
In theory, we already have the tools to secure the email sys-
tem against spoofing. However, significant challenges remain
when these tools are not properly deployed in practice. Recent
measurements conducted in 2015 show that the adoption rates
of SMTP security extensions are far from satisfying [22],
[26]. Among Alexa top 1 million domains, only 40% have
published an SPF record, and an extremely low percentage
of domains (1%) have a DMARC policy. In addition, the
majority of policies are not strictly reject (“reject” policy
means the receiver should reject the email if it failed the
authentication [26]).
These results indicate a real challenge to protect users
against email spoofing. First, with a large number of domains
not publishing an SPF/DKIM record, email providers cannot
reliably detect incoming emails that spoof unprotected do-
mains. Second, even a domain is SPF/DKIM-protected, the
lack of (strict) DMARC policies puts the receiving server
in a difficult position. Without a clear instruction to reject
these emails, what would the receiving email providers do?
Existing works mainly examined the authentication protocols
on the server-side. However, there is still a big gap between the
server-side spoofing detection and the actual impact to users.
D. Research Questions and Method
Our study seeks to understand email spoofing and related
protections from the user perspectives. We have three key
questions. (1) When email providers face uncertainty in au-
thenticating incoming emails, how would they handle the
situation? Under what conditions would forged emails be
delivered to the inbox? (2) Once forged emails get in, what
types of warning mechanisms (if any) are used to notify
users of the unverified sender address? (3) How effective
are existing warning mechanisms to protect users? Answering
these questions is critical to understanding the actual risks that
are exposed to users by email spoofing.
Methods. We answer question (1)–(2) through end-to-
end spoofing experiments (§III, §IV and §V). For a given
email provider, we treat it as a “blackbox”. By controlling
the input (e.g., forged emails) and monitoring the output
(receiver’s inbox), we infer the decision-making process inside
the blackbox. In addition, we empirically examine the usage
of visual security cues to warn users of forged emails.
We answer question (3) by conducting a large user study
(§VI and §VII). The idea is to let users read spoofing/phishing
emails with and without security cues on the interface. Instead
of simply applying traditional user study methods (which
has limitations to capture realistic user behavior [58]), our
approach combines controlled “role-playing” experiments with
“deceptive” real-world phishing tests in order to produce
reliable results.
Ethics. We have taken active steps to ensure research
ethics. Our measurement study only uses dedicated email
accounts owned by the authors and there is no real user
getting involved. In addition, to minimize the impact on the
target email services, we have carefully controlled the message
sending rate (one message every 10 minutes), which is no
different than a regular email user. For the user studies, all the
experiments have obtained user consent either before or after
the study. Email samples used in the user study are completely
benign (screenshots or emails with benign links). For the user
study that involves “deception”, we worked closely with IRB
to review and revise the experiment design. More detailed
ethical discussions will be presented in later sections.
III. ADOPTION OF SMTP EXTENSIONS
The high-level goal of our measurement is to provide an
end-to-end view of email spoofing attacks against popular
email providers. Before doing so, we first examine the recent
adoption rate of email security extensions among Internet
domains compared with that from two years ago [22], [26].
This helps to provide the context for the challenges that email
providers face to authenticate incoming emails.
Scanning Alexa Top 1 Million Domains. Email au-
thentication requires the sender domains to publish their
SPF/DKIM/DMARC records to DNS. To examine the recent
adoption rate of SPF and DMARC among potential sender
domains, in January and October 2017, we crawled two
snapshots of the DNS record for Alexa top 1 million hosts [1].
Similar to existing work [22], [26], this measurement cannot
apply to DKIM, because querying the DKIM record requires
knowing the selector information for every each domain. The
selector information is only available in the DKIM signature
in the email header, which is not a public information. We will
measure the DKIM usage later in the end-to-end experiment.
Results. Table I shows the statistics for the October 2017
snapshot. The results from the January snapshot are very
similar and we refer interested readers to Appendix A. As
shown in Table I, SPF and DMARC both have some increase
in the adoption rate compared to two years ago, but the
increases are not very significant. About 45.0% of the domains
have published a valid SPF record in October 2017 (40% in
2015 [26]), and 4.6% have a valid DMARC record in 2017
TABLE I
SPF/DMARC STATISTICS OF ALEXA 1 MILLION DOMAINS. THE DATA
WAS COLLECTED IN OCTOBER 2017.
Status All Domains # (%) MX Domains # (%)
Total domains 1,000,000 (100%) 803,720 (100%)
w/ SPF 493,367 (49.3%) 475,596 (59.2%)
w/ valid SPF 449,848 (45.0%) 432,669 (53.8%)
Policy: soft fail 275,244 (27.5%) 270,994 (33.7%)
Policy: hard fail 123,084 (12.3%) 111,231 (13.8%)
Policy: neutral 50,437 5.0% 49,381 (6.1%)
Policy: pass 1083(0.1%) 1,063 (0.1%)
w/ DMARC 46,159 (4.6%) 44,318 (5.5%)
w/ valid DMARC 45,580 (4.6%) 43,771 (5.4%)
Policy: none 35,363 (3.5%) 34,387 (4.3%)
Policy: reject 5,614 (0.6%) 4,875 (0.6%)
Policy: quarantine 4,603 (0.5%) 4,509 (0.6%)
(1.1% in 2015 [26]). The invalid records are often caused
by the domain administrators using the wrong format for
the SPF/DMARC record. Another common error is to have
multiple records for SPF (or DMARC), which is equivalent to
“no record” according to RFC7489 [49].
Among the Alexa top 1 million domains, 803,720 domains
are MX domains (i.e., mail exchanger domains that host email
services). The adoption rates among MX domains are slightly
higher (SPF 53.8%, DMARC 5.4%). For non-MX domains,
we argue that it is also important to adopt the anti-spoofing
protocols. For example, office.com is not a MX domain
but it hosts the product web page for the Microsoft Office
software. A potential attacker can spoof office.com to
phish Microsoft Office users (or even Microsoft employees).
SPF and DMARC both specify a policy regarding what
actions the receiver should take after the authentication fails.
Table I shows that only a small portion of the domains spec-
ifies a strict “reject” policy: 12.3% of the domains set “hard
fail” for SPF, and 0.6% set “reject” for DMARC. The rest of
the domains simply leave the decision to the email receiver.
“Soft fail”/“quarantine” means that the email receiver should
process the email with caution. “Neutral”/“none” means that
no policy is specified. SPF’s “pass” means that the receiver
should let the email go through regardless. If a domain has
both SPF and DMARC policies, DMARC overwrites SPF as
long as the DMARC policy is not “none”.
Domains that use DKIM also need to publish their policies
through DMARC. The fact that only 4.6% of the domains
have a valid DMARC record and 0.6% have a “reject” policy
indicates that most DKIM adopters also did not specify a strict
reject policy.
IV. END-TO-END SPOOFING EXPERIMENTS
Given the low adoption rate of SPF and DMARC among
Internet domains, it is still challenging for email providers to
reliably authenticate all incoming emails. When encountering
questionable emails, we are curious about how email providers
make the trade-off between email delivery and security. In the
following, we describe our experiment methodology to answer
two key questions: First, under what conditions will email
providers let forged emails get into the user inbox? Second,
when it happens, would users receive any warnings?
Fig. 2. End-to-end spoofing experiment. Our server is located at E.com
which sends a forged email to the target email service at B.com. The email
spoofs A.com as the sender.
A. Experiment Setup
We conduct end-to-end spoofing experiments on popular
email providers that are used by billions of users. The high-
level idea is illustrated in Figure 2. For a given email provider
(B.com), we put it to the receiving end. We set up a user
account under B.com as the email receiver (test@B.com).
Then we set up an experimental server (E.com) to send forged
emails to the receiver account. Our server runs a Postfix mail
service [2] to directly interact with the target mail server
using SMTP. By controlling the input (the forged email)
and observing the output (the receiver account), we infer the
decision-making process inside of the target email service.
Selecting Target Email Providers. This study focuses on
popular and public email services with two considerations.
First, popular email services such as Yahoo Mail and Gmail
are used by more than one billion users [44], [30]. Their
security policies and design choices are likely to impact
more people. Second, to perform end-to-end experiments,
we need to collect data from the receiver end. Public email
services allow us to create an account as the receiver. Our
experiment methodology is applicable to private email services
but requires collaborations from the internal users.
To obtain a list of popular public email services, we refer
to Adobe’s leaked user database (152 million email addresses,
9.3 million unique email domains) [39]. We ranked the email
domains based on popularity, and manually examined the top
200 domains (counting for 77.7% of all email addresses). After
merging domains from the same service (e.g., hotmail.com
and outlook.com) and excluding services that don’t allow
us to create an account, we obtained a short list of 28 email
domains. To include the more recent public email services, we
searched in Google and added 6 more to the list (34 in total).
We notice that Google’s Gmail and Inbox have very different
email interfaces and we treat them as two different services.
In total, we have 35 popular email services which cover
99.8 million email addresses (65.7%) in the Adobe database.
As an additional reference, we also analyze the Myspace
database (131.4 million email addresses) [53]. We find that
101.8 million email addresses (77.5%) are from the 35 email
services, confirming their popularity.
B. Controlled Parameters
To examine how different factors affect the outcome of
email spoofing, we apply different configurations to the ex-
periment. We primarily focus on parameters of three aspects:
the spoofed sender address, email content, and the receiver’s
email client (user interface).
Spoofed Sender Address. The spoofed sender address
is likely to affect the spoofing result. For example, if the
spoofed domain (A.com) has a valid SPF/DKIM record, then
the receiver (in theory) is able to detect spoofing. In addition,
A.com’s SPF/DMARC policy may also affect the decision of
the receiving email service. We configure three profiles for the
spoofed sender domain: (1) no SPF/DKIM/DMARC record;
(2) SPF/DKIM with a “none” policy; and (3) SPF/DKIM with
a “reject” policy. For each profile, we pick a qualified domain
for the primary experiment (easychair.org, xxx.edu,2
and facebook.com). We use three addresses to intuitively
illustrate the problem. Then to validate the results, we perform
a shadow experiment by randomly selecting 20 domains for
each category (60 in total) from the Alexa top 2000 domains.
The shadow domains are listed in Appendix B.
Email Content. Email content can affect how spam filters
handle the email [10]. Different keywords may have different
weights for the spam filter, leading to almost an infinite testing
space. Our experiment, however, focuses on spoofing (sender
address is forged) instead of spam, and we want to minimize
the impact of spam filters. To this end, we configure 3 emails
with blank content to measure the decision made on forgery
alone. The email content is configured as (1) a blank email, (2)
a blank email with a benign URL (http://google.com),
and (3) a blank email with a benign attachment (empty text
file). The reason for using “benign” content is to test how much
the “spoofing” factor alone contributes to the email providers’
decisions. In addition, to test whether a phishing email can
penetrate the target service, we also include (4) an email with
phishing content. This phishing email is a real-world sample
from a phishing attack targeting our institution in 2017. The
email impersonates the technical support to notify the victim
that her internal account has been suspended and ask her to re-
activate the account using a URL (to an Amazon EC2 server).
Email Client. We examine how different email clients warn
users of forged emails. We consider 3 common email clients:
(1) a web client, (2) a mobile app, and (3) a third-party email
client. All the 35 selected services have a web interface, and
28 have a dedicated mobile app. Third-party clients refer to the
email applications (e.g., Microsoft Outlook and Apple Mail)
that allow users to check emails from any email providers.
V. SPOOFING EXPERIMENT RESULTS
In this section, we describe our findings from the end-
to-end spoofing experiments. First, to provide the context,
we measure the authentication mechanisms (SPF/DKIM/D-
MARC) that the email providers use to detect forged emails.
Then, we examine how email providers handle forged emails
and identify key factors that help forged emails to reach user
inbox. For emails that successfully get in, we examine whether
and how email providers warn users about their potential risks.
Finally, we present case studies on email providers that have
2For anonymous submission, we use “xxx.edu” to represent our institu-
tion’s email domain. “xxx” does not necessarily mean it contains three letters.
misleading UIs which help the attacker to make the forged
email look more authentic.
A. Authentication Mechanisms
To better interpret the results, we first examine how the
35 email providers authenticate incoming emails. One way
of knowing their authentication protocols is to analyze the
email headers and look for authentication results of SPF/D-
KIM/DMARC. While this method works for some of the email
providers, it will miss those (e.g., qq.com) that do not add
the authentication results to the header. Instead, we follow a
more reliable measurement method [26]. The high-level idea
is to setup an authoritative DNS server for our own domain.
Then we send a forged email to the target email service by
spoofing our own domain. In the meantime, the authoritative
DNS server will wait and see whether the target email service
will query our SPF/DKIM/DMARC record. We set the TTL
of the SPF, DKIM and DMARC records as 1 (second) to force
the target email service always querying our authoritative DNS
server for these records. The results (collected in August 2017)
are shown in Table II (left 4 columns). 35 email providers can
be grouped into 3 categories based on their protocols:
• Full Authentication (16): Email services that perform all
three authentication checks (SPF, DKIM and DMARC).
This category includes the most popular email services
such as Gmail, Yahoo Mail, Hotmail and Apple’s iCloud.
• SPF/DKIM but no DMARC (15): Email services that
check either SPF/DKIM to authenticate incoming emails,
but do not check the sender’s DMARC policy. These email
services are likely to make decisions on their own.
• No Authentication (4): Email services that do not per-
form any of the three authentication protocols.
During this experiment, we observe that gmx.com,
mail.com and inbox.lv block all the emails from dy-
namic IPs. In our spoofing experiment, we use dynamic an IP
as default to simulate a worse-case scenario for attackers, but
we use a static IP for these three services.
B. Decisions on Forged Emails
Next, we examine the decision-making process on forged
emails. As a primary experiment, we send 12 forged emails to
each of the 35 email services (3 spoofed addresses × 4 types
of email content). In August 2017, we shuffled all the emails
and set a sending time interval of 10 minutes to minimize
the impact to the target services. Note that we do not send
a large volume of emails (only 12 emails per service). This
traffic volume is extremely low compared to the hundreds of
billions of emails sent over the Internet every day [4]. We
intentionally limit our experiment scale so that the experiment
emails would not impact the target services (and their email
filters) in any significant ways. This is also to avoid emails
sent earlier affecting the ones sent later in the experiments.
To validate the results of the primary experiment, we will
also conduct a shadow experiment by testing more spoofed
domains.
TABLE II
RESULTS OF THE END-TO-END SPOOFING EXPERIMENT (PRIMARY). TO BETTER ILLUSTRATE THE RESULTS, ( ) INDICATES THE EMAIL IS DELIVERED TO
THE INBOX; ( ) INDICATES THE EMAIL IS PLACED TO THE SPAM FOLDER; ( ) INDICATES THE EMAIL IS BLOCKED WITHOUT DELIVERY.
Email Provider Supported Spoof easychair.org Spoof xxx.edu Spoof facebook.com # to
Protocols (No SPF/DKIM/DMARC) (SPF/DKIM;DMARC=none) (SPF/DKIM;DMARC=strict) Inbox
SPF DKIM DMARC Blank URL Attach Phish Blank URL Attach Phish Blank URL Attach Phish
hotmail.com X X X 0/12
aol.com X X X 1/12
seznam.cz X X X 1/12
163.com X X X 2/12
126.com X X X 3/12
yeah.net X X X 3/12
yahoo.com X X X 4/12
mail.ru X X X 5/12
tutanota.com X X X 6/12
gmail.com X X X 7/12
gmail inbox X X X 7/12
icloud.com X X X 7/12
naver.com X X X 8/12
protonmail.com X X X 8/12
fastmail.com X X X 8/12
inbox.lv X X X 8/12
runbox.com X X 5 0/12
o2.pl X X 5 1/12
wp.pl X X 5 1/12
interia.pl X 5 5 5/12
sapo.pt X 5 5 5/12
mynet.com X X 5 6/12
op.pl X X 5 8/12
gmx.com X X 5 8/12
mail.com X X 5 8/12
qq.com X X 5 10/12
daum.net X 5 5 10/12
zoho.com X X 5 11/12
sina.com X X 5 12/12
juno.com X X 5 12/12
sohu.com X 5 5 12/12
rediffmail.com 5 5 5 7/12
freemail.hu 5 5 5 8/12
t-online.de 5 5 5 11/12
excite.com 5 5 5 12/12
The experiment results are shown in Table II. We group
email providers based on the supported authentication pro-
tocols. Then within each category, we rank email providers
based on the number of forged emails that arrived the inbox.
Observations. First, we find that forged emails are able
to penetrate most of the email services. 33 out of the 35
services allowed at least one forged email to arrive the inbox.
30 services allowed at least one phishing email to get into
the inbox. Particularly, this phishing email has penetrated
email providers that perform full authentications (e.g., Gmail,
iCloud, Yahoo Mail) when spoofing easychair.org and
xxx.edu. This suggests that even though the email providers
detected the email forgery (based on SPF/DKIM), they still
deliver the phishing message to the user inbox.
Second, comparing different email providers, we observe
that those without authentication schemes are indeed more
vulnerable. To better illustrate the trend, we plot Figure 3(a)
and Figure 3(b) to show the penetration rate (the ratio of emails
in the inbox over all the emails). Clearly, email providers
with no authentications have the highest penetration rate
ranging from 0.56–1.0 depending on the spoofed address.
Since these services did not check the SPF/DKIM record, it
is possible they rely on the domain reputation or sensitivity
to take different actions (e.g., Facebook is more sensitive than
Easychair). As a comparison, email providers that perform
authentications have a lower penetration rate: 0.43–0.77 for
those that only perform SPF/DKIM, and 0.03–0.61 for those
that perform full authentications.
Third, from the sender domain’s perspective, setting
a “reject” policy makes a big difference. For example,
facebook.com has a “reject” DMARC policy. As long as
the email providers check the DMARC record, almost 100% of
them rejected the emails. The only exception is iCloud which
allows two forged Facebook emails to pass. We suspect that
iCloud treated the sender policy as a “feature” in their decision
function instead of enforcing the policy.
Shadow Experiment. While the primary experiments help
to illustrate the problem in an intuitive manner, the choice of
the 3 spoofed domains may introduce biases. Here we run
a shadow experiment to make sure our observations are not
entirely dependent on the 3 selected sender addresses. As pre-
viously described, the shadow experiment spoofs 60 domains,
20 for each of the 3 sender profiles: (1) No SPF/DKIM/D-
MARC; (2) SPF/DKIM and “none” policy; (3) SPF/DKIM
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Fig. 3. Penetration rate for different combinations of the sender and the receiver. The x-axis shows 3 spoofed sender profiles: Profile1: No SPF/DKIM/DMARC
(easychair.org); Profile2: SPF/DKIM and none policy (xxx.edu); Profile 3: SPF/DKIM and reject policy (facebook.com). The legend displays the 3 authentication
groups of the receivers. The primary experiment covers 3 sender addresses. The shadow experiment covers 60 sender addresses, 20 for each sender profile.
TABLE III
FEATURE RANKING.
Feature Chi-square Mutual Information
Spoofed sender profile 202.30 0.063
Receiver authentication method 152.59 0.058
Email content 0.62 0.00069
and “reject” policy. The complete list of sender domains is
shown in Appendix B. The emails are also shuffled and sent
with a 10-minute interval. The result is shown in Figure 3(c).
The penetration rates are not exactly the same with the primary
experiment but the overall trends and conclusions remain con-
sistent. For example, facebook.com has a lower penetration
rate than the corresponding group in the shadow experiment.
This is likely because facebook.com is a more “sensitive”
domain. The consistent trends are: (1) domains that published
SPF/DKIM/DMARC and/or strict policies are harder to spoof;
(2) email providers that perform authentication are harder to
penetrate.
Impacting Factors in the Experiment. To determine
which factors contribute more to a successful penetration, we
perform a “feature ranking” analysis. We divide all the emails
in the primary and shadow experiments into two classes:
positive (inbox) and negative (spam folder or blocked). For
each email, we calculate three features: email content (F1),
sender profile (F2) and receiver authentication group (F3),
all of which are categorical variables. Then we rank features
based on their distinguishing power to classify emails into the
two classes. We use two widely used feature ranking metrics:
Chi-Square Statistics [43] and Mutual Information [16]. As
shown in Table III, consistently, “spoofed sender profile” is the
most important factor, followed by the “receiver authentication
method”. Note that this analysis only compares the relative
importance of factors in our experiment. We are not trying to
reverse-engineer the whole spoofing detection system, which
will require analyzing more features.
Discussion. It takes both the sender and the receiver email
services to make a reliable email authentication. When one
of them fails to do their job, there is a higher chance for
the forged email to get into the user inbox. In addition, we
find that email providers have the tendency to prioritize email
delivery over security. When an email fails the SPF/DKIM/D-
MARC check, most of the providers (including Gmail and
iCloud) would still deliver the email as long as the policy
of the spoofed domain is not “reject”. Based on the earlier
measurement result (§III), only 12.3% of the top 1 million
domains have set a “reject” or “hard fail” policy, which leaves
plenty of room for attackers to perform spoofing attacks.
C. Email Clients and Security Cues
Our results show that most email services allow forged
emails to reach the inbox. Next, we examine email interfaces
to see what type of security cues are displayed to warn users.
Web Client. During our experiment, only 6 email services
have displayed security cues on forged emails to alert users,
including gmail, and protonmail (US), naver (South
Korea), mail.ru (Russia), and 2 services from the same
company in China: 163.com and 126.com. All the other
email services display forged emails without any visual alert
(e.g., Yahoo Mail, iCloud). Note that Gmail and Google Inbox
are developed by the same company, but the web version of
Google Inbox has no security cue.
Figure 4 (a)–(e) show the screenshots of the security cues.
Gmail’s cue is a “question mark” on the sender’s icon. Only
when users move the mouse over the image, it will show the
following message: “Gmail could not verify that <sender>
actually sent this message (and not a spammer)”. The red
lock icon is not related to spoofing, but to indicate the com-
munication between MX servers is unencrypted. On the other
hand, services like naver, 163.com and protonmail use
explicit text messages to warn users.
Mobile Client. Compared to the web interface, mobile apps
have even fewer security cues. Out of the 28 email services
with a dedicated mobile app, only 4 services have mobile
security cues including naver, protonmail, gmail, and
google inbox. The other services removed the security
cues for mobile users. Compared to the web interface, mobile
apps have more limited screen size. Developers often remove
or hide less important information and UI elements to keep a
“clean” interface. Unfortunately, the security cues are among
the removed elements.
Third-party Client. Finally, we check emails using third-
party clients including Microsoft Outlook, Apple Mail, and
Yahoo Web Mail. We test both desktop and mobile versions,
and find that none of them provide security cues for forged
Fig. 4. Security cues on forged emails from 9 email providers. (a)–(e) are for regular forged emails. (f)–(h) only show up when the spoofed sender and the
receiver belong to the same provider. (i) only shows up when spoofing an existing contact.
emails. This is not too surprising considering that the email
client and the mail server are from different companies.
D. Misleading UI Elements
Under special conditions, attackers may trigger misleading
elements on the user interface (UI) to make the forged email
more realistic. In the following, we describe three special
conditions that can trigger misleading UIs.
Spoofing an Existing Contact. We find that when
an attacker spoofs an existing contact of the receiver, the
forged email can trigger misleading UI elements. Certain email
services will automatically load the contact’s photo, name
card or previous email conversations alongside the forged
email, which helps the attacker to make the forged email
look authentic. To demonstrate this phenomenon, we perform
a quick experiment as follows: First, we create an “existing
contact” (contact@xxx.edu) for each receiver account in
the 35 email services, and add a name, a profile photo and
a phone number (if allowed). Then we spoof this contact’s
address (contact@xxx.edu) to send 4 forged emails to
each target service (4 types of content).
Table IV shows the 25 email providers that have misleading
UIs: 6 services automatically load the contact’s profile photo,
17 services have a clickable name card, and 17 services display
a link (or a widget) for historical emails with this contact
(screenshots in Appendix C). We believe that these designs
aim to improve the usability of the email service by providing
the context information for the sender. However, when the
sender address is actually spoofed, these UI elements would
help attackers to make the forged email look more authentic.
In addition, spoofing an existing contact allows forged
emails to penetrate new email providers. For example, Hotmail
blocked all the forged emails in Table II. However, when we
spoof an existing contact, Hotmail delivers the forged email
to the inbox and adds a special warning sign as shown in
Figure 4(i).
Same-domain Spoofing. Another way to trigger the mis-
leading UI element is to spoof an email address that belongs
to the same email provider as the receiver (Table V). For
TABLE IV
MISLEADING UI ELEMENTS WHEN THE ATTACKER SPOOFS AN EXISTING
CONTACT. (∗) INDICATES WEB INTERFACE ONLY. (†) INDICATES MOBILE
ONLY. OTHERWISE, IT APPLIES TO BOTH INTERFACES.
Misleading UI Email Providers (25 out of 35)
Sender Photo (6) G-Inbox, gmail, zoho, icloud∗, gmx†, mail.com†
Name Card (17) yahoo, hotmail, tutanota, seznam.cz, fastmail, gmx,
mail.com, gmail∗, sina∗, juno∗, aol∗, 163.com†,
126.com†, yeah.net†, sohu†, naver†, zoho†
Email History (17) hotmail, 163.com, 126.com, yeah.net, qq, zoho,
mail.ru, yahoo∗, gmail∗, sina∗, naver∗, op.pl∗,
interia.pl∗, daum.net∗ gmx.com∗, mail∗, inbox.lv∗
TABLE V
MISLEADING UI ELEMENTS DURING THE SAME-DOMAIN SPOOFING. (†)
INDICATES MOBILE INTERFACE ONLY.
Misleading UI Email Providers (3 out of 35)
Sender Photo (3) seznam.cz, google Inbox, gmail†
example, when spoofing <forged@seznam.cz> to send
an email to <test@eznam.cz>, the profile photo of the
spoofed sender will be automatically loaded onto the interface.
Because the spoofed sender is also from the same provider,
the email provider can easily load the sender’s photo from its
own database. This phenomenon applies to Google Inbox and
Gmail (mobile) too.
Same-domain spoofing, however, is more difficult to deliver
the forged email to the inbox. As a simple experiment, we
send 4 emails each target email provider by spoofing their
own domains. Only 14 email providers have allowed a forged
email to reach the inbox (the corresponding number is 33
for Table II). Providers also alert users more with special
security cues. As shown in Figure 4(f)-(h), related email
providers include protonmail, gmail and daum.net.
This suggests that email providers are doing a better job
in detecting forged emails that claim to be from their own
services. Together with previously observed security cues,
there are in total 9 email services that provide at least one
type of security cues.
False Security Cues. One email provider seznam.cz
displays a false security cue to users. seznam.cz performs
Fig. 5. Seznam.cz displays a “trusted address” sign on a forged address.
full authentications but still delivers a phishing email to the
inbox. Figure 5 shows that seznam.cz displays a green
checkmark on the sender address even though the address
is forged. When users click on the icon, it displays “trusted
address”, which is likely to give users a false sense of security.
E. Other Vulnerabilities
We find that 2 email services “sapo.pt” and
“runbox.com” are not carefully configured, allowing
an attacker to piggyback on their mail servers to send
forge emails. This threat model is very different from our
experiments above, and we briefly describe it using Figure 1.
Here, the attacker is the sender MUA, and the vulnerable
server (e.g., runbox.com) is the sender service. Typically,
Runbox should only allow its users to send an email with the
sender address as “{someone}@runbox.com”. However,
the Runbox’s server allows a user (the attacker) to set the
“MAIL FROM” freely (without requiring a verification) in
step ¶ to send forged emails. This attack does not help the
forged email to bypass the SPF/DKIM check. However, it
gives the attacker a static and reputable IP address. If the
attacker aggressively sends malicious emails through the
vulnerable mail server, it can damage the reputation of the
IP. We have reported the vulnerability to the service admins.
VI. EFFECTIVENESS OF SECURITY CUES
Thus far, our results show that email providers tend to
prioritize email delivery over security when the sender address
cannot be verified. As a result, forged emails have the chance
to reach the user inbox. While most email services fail to warn
users, a few did have implemented visual security cues on the
user interface. In the following, we seek to understand how
effective these security cues are to improve user efficacy in
detecting phishing emails.
A. Challenges in Security Usability Study
To evaluate the effectiveness of security cues, we seek
to design a user study where participants examine phishing
emails (with forged sender addresses). By controlling the
security cues on the interface, we assess how well security
cues help users to handle phishing emails more securely.
Implementing this idea faces a key challenge in security
usability study, which is to capture realistic user reactions to
security attacks. Ideally, participants should examine phishing
emails without knowing that they are in an experiment. This
leads to key challenges to: (1) to set up the experiment and
obtain user consent upfront; (2) to test a variety of experiment
conditions since each participant can only be “deceived” once.
TABLE VI
EXPERIMENT SETTINGS.
Experiment (N = 913) Conditions Variables
Study 1 (N1 = 425) role-playing content (4) × security cue (2)
Study 2 (N2 = 488) real-world content (1) × security cue (2)
TABLE VII
EMAIL SAMPLES USED IN OUR USER STUDY, INCLUDING 4 PHISHING
EMAILS (P) AND 4 LEGITIMATE EMAILS (LEGIT).
Email ID A Brief Description of the Email
P-Greed Upgrading your Office 360 for free.
P-Curiosity Your message delivery is delayed, check the reason here.
P-Urgency You got 24 hours to verify your account.
P-Fear Our evidence shows that you sent a terroristic threat.
Legit-1 An updated meeting schedule sent from a colleague.
Legit-2 A welcome message from Twitter.
Legit-3 Try-one-month-for-free from Netflix.
Legit-4 Email from Facebook to reset your password.
As a result, most security usability studies follow a “role-
playing” approach, where participants are instructed to play
a pre-defined role in a hypothetical scenario [52], [59], [63],
[65], [67]. Researchers often hide the true purpose of the study
and observe the user behavior. The “role-playing” method
allows researchers to test a variety of controlled settings. The
drawback, however, is that participants may behave differently
from the real-world.
To this end, we explore a hybrid approach by combining
role-playing experiments with real-world deceptive studies
(Table VI). We leverage the controlled role-playing experi-
ments to test a variety of conditions and then use a deceptive
phishing experiment to perform a more focused study.
B. Study 1: Role-Playing Experiment
Fist, we conduct a “role-playing” experiment where partic-
ipants play a pre-defined role to read a set of phishing and
non-phishing emails.
Study Procedure. We conduct a user survey where the
participant plays the role of an employee (named Pat Jones) in
a company. The participant is expected to see emails from his
colleagues, the company’s IT department, and various online
services. Each email is presented as a screenshot of the full
email interface. After the participant reads each email, we
ask “how would you respond to this email” with 8 options
including “Reply by email”, “Contact the sender by phone
or in person”, “Delete the email”, “Do nothing”, “Click on
the URL”, “Copy and paste the URL to the browser”, “Visit
the website directly”, and “Others (please specify)”. The last
option is to collect open answers. The participant can check
multiple options that apply.
Like most role-playing studies, we avoid mentioning the
keywords “security” or “phishing” in the instruction. Instead,
we distract the participants using a non-security task, stating
that the survey is to study email usage habit, email miscom-
munications and how people handle different types of emails.
We also ask a few distraction questions regarding how long
they have been using email services, and how often they check
their personal emails.
Email Samples. We select 4 phishing emails representing
4 types of human emotions that are commonly exploited in
social engineering including greed, curiosity, urgency, and
fear [57]. Table VII shows a brief description of the email
content. All 4 emails are real-world phishing emails that once
targeted our institution. For comparison, we select another 4
real-world legitimate emails. All emails contain a URL link in
the email body. To avoid overwhelming the participant, each
participant will only read 5 emails including the 4 legitimate
emails and 1 phishing email.
Security Cues. Based on our previous measurement, most
email services adopted text-based cues (Figure 4(b)-(i)). Even
Gmail’s special cue (Figure 4(a)) will display a text message
when users move the mouse over. To this end, we use text-
based cue and make two settings, namely with security cue
and without security cue. We added the security cue to all
the phishing emails’ interfaces to measure its impact. We
present the screenshots of the full email interfaces as shown
in Appendix D. We use Yahoo Mail interface to be consistent
with the later study 2. We also add the cue to 1 of the 4
legitimate emails to measure the impact of the false alert.
Recruiting Participants. We recruited N = 425 partici-
pants in total from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk
users usually come from diverse backgrounds, more diverse
than typical college student samples [8]. The participants
are evenly divided into 8 groups (46-65 users per group).
Each group works under one experiment setting (8 settings
in total: 4 phishing emails × 2 security cues). To avoid
non-serious users, we apply the screening criteria that are
commonly used in MTurk [9], [27]. We recruit users from the
U.S. who have a minimum Human Intelligence Task (HIT)
approval rate of 90%, and more than 50 approved HITs. Each
participant can only take the survey once to earn $0.5. To
make each experiment independent, we strictly limit a user to
only participating in one experiment setting (the uniqueness is
guaranteed both within HITs and across HITs).
Demographic analysis shows that our participants come
from relatively diverse backgrounds: 44.2% are male and
55.5% are female (0.2% chose not to disclose). Most partici-
pants are 30–39 years old (34.4%), followed by users within
19–29 (32.2%), above 50 (17.2%) and 40–49 (16.2%). Most
of the participants have a bachelor degree (39.1%) or a college
degree (29.2%). About 20.8% have a graduate degree and
11.1% are high-school graduates.
C. Study 2: Real-World Phishing Tests
Even though the role-playing experiment distracts the par-
ticipants with non-security tasks, the experiment design may
still affect user behavior. For example, participants in study
1 receive instructions to examine emails one by one. The
setup is likely to help participants to be mentally concentrated
when reading emails (e.g., leading to a better performance of
detecting spoofing). In practice, users are usually caught off
guard by phishing emails. To these ends, we design a deceptive
experiment to examine a user’s natural reaction to phishing
emails. We follow the common practices of deceptive studies
and obtains informed user consent after the experiment.
Study Procedure. This study contains two phases. Phase1
is to set up the deception and phase 2 carries out the phishing
experiment. Like study 1, we also frame the study with a non-
security purpose.
Phase1: The participant starts by entering her own email
address. Then we immediately send the participant an email
and instruct the participant to check this email from her
email account. The email contains a tracking pixel (a 1×1
transparent image) to measure if the email has been opened.
After that, we ask a few questions about the email (to make
sure they actually opened the email), and other distractive
questions such as their email usage habits. Phase1 has three
purposes: (1) to make sure the participants actually own the
email address they entered; (2) to test if the tracking pixel
works, considering that some users may configure their email
service to block images or HTML; (3) to set up the deception:
after phase1, we give the participants the impression that the
survey is completed (participants get paid after phase1). In this
way, participants would not expect a second phishing email.
Phase2: We wait for 10 days and send the second phishing
email. The second email contains a benign URL pointing to
our own server to measure whether the URL is clicked. In
addition, the email body contains a tracking pixel to measure
if the email has been opened. The second email is only sent to
users whose email service is not configured to block HTML or
tracking pixels (based on phase1). We wait for another 20 days
to monitor user clicks. After the study, we send a debriefing
email which explains the true purpose of the experiment and
obtain the informed consent. Participants can withdraw their
data anytime. By the time of our submission, none of the users
have requested to withdraw their data.
Email Samples. For phase 2, we use P-Curiosity,
since it is the most effective content in study 1. We imper-
sonate Amazon Mechanical Turk (support@mturk.com)
to send this email. For phase 1, we use a different content
(P-Greedy) to reduce the probability that the participant
realizes the second email is part of the study.
Security Visual Cues. To be consistent with study 1, we
also have 2 settings for security cues. The key difference is
that we no longer use screenshots, but display the security
cues on the actual email interface. For the group without
security cue, we recruit users from Yahoo Mail. We choose
Yahoo Mail users because Yahoo Mail is the largest email
service that has not implemented any security cues. For the
comparison group with security cue, we still recruit Yahoo
Mail users and add our own security cues to their interfaces.
More specifically, when sending emails, we can embed a piece
of HTML code in the email body mimicking a text-based cue
(see Appendix D). Note that this is how most email providers
insert their warning cues in the email body (except Gmail). To
be consistent, study 1 was also using Yahoo Mail’s interface
to take the screenshots.
Uncontrolled Parameters. Since we cannot give any
instructions in phase2, we cannot control if a user uses the
mobile app or the website to read the email. This is not a big
issue for Yahoo Mail users. Yahoo’s web and mobile clients
both render HTML by default. The text-based cue is embedded
in the email body by us, which will be displayed consistently
for both web and mobile users.
Recruiting Participants. To collect enough data points
from phase 2, we need to recruit a large number of users given
that many users may not open our email. In total, we recruited
N = 488 users from MTurk: 243 users for the “without
security cue” setting and 245 users for the “with security cue”
setting. Each user can only participate one setting for only
once to receive $0.5. If a user already participated in study
1, this user will be no longer qualified for study 2. In the
recruiting letter, we explicitly informed the users that we need
to collect their email address. This may introduce self-selection
bias: we are likely to recruit people who are willing to share
their email address with our research team. Our result shows
that the resulting user demographics are still very similar to
those in study 1: 49% are male and 51% are female. Most
participants are 30–39 years old (39.1%), followed by users
under 29 (31.8%), above 50 (14.5%), and 40–49 (14.5%).
Most of the participants have a bachelor degree (35.0%) or
a college degree (33.8%), followed by those with a graduate
degree (20.7%) and high-school graduates (10.5%).
D. Ethic Guidelines
Our study received IRB approval, and we have taken active
steps to protect the participants. In study 1, phishing emails
are presented as screenshots (not clickable) which incur no
risks. For study 2, only benign URLs are placed in the emails
which point to our own server. Clicking on the URL does not
introduce practical risks to the participants or their computers.
Although we can see the participant’s IP, we choose not
to store the IP information in our dataset. In addition, we
followed the recommended practice from IRB to conduct the
deceptive experiment. In the experiment instruction, we omit
information only if it is absolutely necessary (e.g., the purpose
of the study and details about the second email). Revealing
such information upfront will invalidate our results. After the
experiment, we immediately contact the participants to explain
our real purpose and the detailed procedure. We offer the
opportunity for the participants to opt out. Users who opt-out
still get the full payment.
VII. USER STUDY RESULTS
We now analyze the user study results to answer the
following questions. First, how effective are security cues in
protecting users? Second, how does the impact of security cues
vary across different user demographics?
A. Results from Role-Playing Experiments
To establish a baseline, we first analyze user behavior
under no security cues. Table VIII shows the top 3 user
reactions to phishing and legitimate emails. We observe that
TABLE VIII
TOP 3 USER REACTIONS WITHOUT SECURITY CUES (S1).
Email ID Top 3 User Reactions (% of Users)
P-Greed Delete (43%) Click (32%) NoAction (24%)
P-Curiosity Click (44%) NoAction (22%) Delete (20%)
P-Urgency Click (37%) Delete (22%) Visit (22%)
P-Fear Contact (48%) Click (20%) Delete (18%)
Legit-1 Delete (38%) NoAction (31%) Click (26%)
Legit-2 Delete (45%) Click (26%) NoAction (24%)
Legit-3 NoAction (31%) Click (25%) Delete (23%)
Legit-4 Reply (46%) Click (31%) NoAction (20%)
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Fig. 6. Click-through rate of phishing URLs in study 1. “URL click” refers
to users selecting “Clicking on the URL” option in the survey.
user action is highly dependent on the email content. For
example, P-Curiosity and P-Urgency are most effective
in tricking users to click on the URL in the email (the riskiest
action). For P-Greed and P-Fear, “clicking” is the second
most common action. The result demonstrates the effectiveness
of phishing emails.
Figure 6 shows the “click-through rate” of the URLs
when security cues are presented. Note that for study 1, the
“clicking” is simulated, which refers to users selecting the
“click on the URL” option in the survey. We observe that the
security cue has a clear impact on the user action. Comparing
with the groups “without security cues”, the click-through
rate of those “with security cue” drops by 12.3%–37.9%. The
examine the statistical significance of the observed differences,
we run the Fisher’s exact test3 for the two controlled groups
(“with cue” and “without cue”) and the outcome (“clicked”
and “not clicked”). Across all 4 email types, the differences
are significant (p < 0.05). The results suggest that security
cues have a significant impact to reduce the user tendency
of clicking on phishing URLs. In addition, Figure 6 shows
that false alerts also reduce URL clicks — false alerts do not
introduce direct harms to users. The negative impact might be
in the long run: if users are constantly exposed to false alerts,
users are more likely to ignore similar alerts [7].
B. Results from Real-world Phishing Tests
For study 2, the click-through rate should be computed
based on users who opened the email instead of all the users.
This is because some participants did not check their inbox
during our monitoring period, and did not have the chance to
see the security cue. To evaluate the impact of the security
3We also run the Chi-Square test and the results are consistent. In the rest
of the paper, if not otherwise stated, we omit the Chi-Square result for brevity.
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Fig. 7. The joint impact of demographic factors and security cues on click rates. For age, we divide users into Young (age<40) and Old (age>=40); For
education level, we divide users into High-Edu (bachelor degree or higher) and Low-Edu (no bachelor degree). The thresholds are set so that the two compared
groups have relatively even sizes.
TABLE IX
STUDY 2 STATISTICS.
Phase Users Without Cue With Cue
Phase1 All Participants 243 245Not Blocking Pixel 176 179
Phase2
Opened Email 94 86
Clicked URL 46 32
Click Rate 48.9% 37.2%
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Fig. 8. Click-through rate of P-Curiosity in study 1 (role-playing) and study
2 (real-phishing).
cue, we first identify users who opened the email based on
the tracking pixel. As shown in Table IX, 176 and 179 users
did not block tracking pixels in phase1. During phase2, 94
and 86 of them have opened the email.
The results indicate that security cues have a positive impact
to reduce phishing risks. When the security cue is presented,
the click rate is numerically lower (37.2%) compared to that
without security cues (48.9%). This result is consistent with
study 1. In addition, we observe that the difference between
the two user groups in study 2 is not as big as that in study 1 as
shown in Figure 8. Fisher’s exact test for phase 2 shows that
p = 0.1329, indicating the difference is insignificant. Under
realistic phishing experiments, the impact of the security cue
is not as strong as that in the role-playing setting. This may
attribute to the fact that users are caught off guard in phase 2.
C. Demographic Factors
Finally, we cross-examine the results with respect to the
demographic factors in Figure 7. For the role-playing statistics,
we aggregate the results for all 4 types of email content. To
make sure each demographic group contains enough users, we
create binary groups for each factor. For “education level”, we
divide users into High-Edu (bachelor degree or higher) and
Low-Edu (no bachelor degree). For “age”, we divide users
into Young (age<40) and Old (age>=40). The thresholds are
chosen so that the two groups are of relatively even sizes. As
shown in Figure 7, the click rates are consistently lower when
a security cue is presented for all the demographic groups.
The differences are statistically significant for all the role-
playing settings (p < 0.05 based on Fisher’s test). The dif-
ferences for real-world phishing are insignificant (the smallest
p = 0.06 which is produced by the low-edu group). The result
confirms the positive impact of security cue across different
user demographics. The statistically significant result from the
role-playing experiment suggests that security cues have the
potential to improve user efficacy in detecting phishing emails.
The result from the real-world phishing tests indicates that the
impact of security cues is not as strong when users are caught
off-guard. Further research is needed to improve the design of
security cues to maximize its positive impact.
VIII. DISCUSSION
Email Availability vs. Security. Our study shows many
email providers choose to deliver a forged email to the inbox
even when the email fails the authentication. This is a difficult
trade-off between security and email availability. If an email
provider blocks all the unverified emails, users are likely to
lose their emails (e.g., from domains that did not publish an
SPF, DKIM or DMARC record). Losing legitimate emails is
unacceptable for email services which will easily drive users
away. The current challenge is the slow adoption rates of these
anti-spoofing protocols among the Internet and MX domains.
Countermeasures. If the email providers decide to deliver
an unverified email to the inbox, we believe it is necessary
to place a security cue to warn users. Our user study shows a
positive impact of security cues in reducing risky user actions.
Another potential benefit of implementing security cue is that
it can act as a forcing function for sender domains to configure
their SPF/DKIM/DMARC correctly.
There are other fixes that email providers (and protocol
designers) may consider. First, email providers should consider
adopting SPF, DKIM and DMARC. Even though they cannot
authenticate all the incoming emails, they allow the email
providers to make more informed decisions. The current
challenge is that these protocols have their own usability issues
and limitations (documented in [38], [18], [49]). Extensive
work is needed to make them easier to deploy and configure,
to avoid major disruptions to the existing email operation [14].
Second, email providers should make the security cues
consistently for different interfaces. Currently, mobile users are
exposed to a higher-level of risks due to the lack of security
cues. Another example is that Google Inbox (web) users are
less protected compared to Gmail users. Third, misleading UI
elements such as “profile photo” and “email history” should
be disabled for emails with unverified sender addresses.
Questions Moving Forward. Security cues help to reduce
the phishing risk but cannot eliminate the risk completely.
Further research is needed to understand how to design more
effective cues to maximize its impact on users. Another
related question is how to maintain the long-term effectiveness
of security cues and overcome “warning fatigue” [7]. For
security-critical users (e.g., journalists, military personnel),
security cues can only be a complementary solution. A better
alternative is to use end-to-end encryption schemes such as
PGP [28]. Further efforts are still needed to make PGP widely
accessible and usable for the broad population [29], [47].
Study Limitations. Our study has a few limitations. First,
our measurement focuses on public email services. Future
work will explore if the conclusion also applies to non-public
email services. Second, while we have taken significant efforts
to maintain the validity of the user study, there are still limits
to what we can control. For example, in study 1, we use a
non-security task to distract the participants. It is possible that
some participants may still infer that security is the focus of
the study. In study 2, we only perform the user study on Yahoo
Mail users with a focus on a text-based cue. Our future work
will look into expanding the experiments to cover other email
services and explore different security cue designs (e.g., color,
font, the wording of the message). Third, we use “clicking on
the phishing URL” as a measure of risky actions, which is still
not the final step of a phishing attack. However, tricking users
to give way their actual passwords would have a major ethical
implication, and we decided not to pursue this step.
IX. RELATED WORK
Email Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity. SMTP
extensions such as SPF, DKIM, DMARC and STARTTLS
are used to provide security properties for email transport.
Recently, researchers conducted detailed measurements on the
server-side usage of these protocols [22], [26], [34]. Unlike
prior work, we focus on the user-end and demonstrate the
gaps between server-side spoofing detection and the user-end
notifications. Our study is complementary to existing work to
depict a more complete picture.
Email Phishing. Prior works have developed phishing
detection methods based on features extracted from email
content and headers [19], [21], [25], [35], [50], [55]. Phishing
detection is different from spam filtering [56] because phishing
emails are not necessarily sent in bulks [64] but can be highly
targeted [33]. Other than spoofing, attackers may also apply
typosquatting or unicode characters [5] to make the sender
address appear similar (but not identical) to what they want
to impersonate. Such sender address is a strong indicator of
phishing which has been used to detect phishing emails [40],
[42]. Another line of research focuses on the phishing website,
which is usually the landing page of the URL in a phishing
email [17], [32], [62], [66], [69], [70].
Human factors (demographics, personality, cognitive biases,
fatigue) would affect users response to phishing [51], [31],
[36], [52], [59], [63], [65], [67], [15], [45]. While most of
these studies use the “role-playing” method, there are rare
exceptions [36], [51] where the researchers conducted a real-
world phishing experiment. Our work is the first to examine
the impact of security cues on phishing emails, using both role-
playing and realistic phishing experiments. Our results show
the different behavior of users in the role-playing and real-
world settings. An early work also demonstrates behavioral
differences in the role-playing experiments in online authen-
tication scenarios [58].
Visual Security Cues. Security cues are commonly used
in web or mobile browsers to warn users of insecure web ses-
sions [24], [37], [60], [48], phishing webpages [20], [23], [67],
[68], and malware sites [6]. Existing work shows that users
often ignore the security cues due to the lack of understanding
of the attack [67] or the frequent exposure to false alarms [41].
Researchers have explored various methods to make security
UIs harder to ignore such as using attractors [11], [12], [13].
Our work is the first to measure the usage and effectiveness of
security cues on forged emails. We find that although security
cues cannot completely eliminate users’ risky actions, they
help to reduce such risk.
X. CONCLUSION
Through extensive measurements, controlled user studies
and real-world phishing tests, our work reveals a concerning
gap between the server-side email spoofing detection and the
actual protection on users. We demonstrate that most email
providers allow forged emails to get to user inbox, while
lacking the necessary warning mechanism to notify users
(particularly on mobile apps). For the few email services that
implemented security cues, we show that security cues have a
positive impact on reducing risky user actions under phishing
attacks but cannot eliminate the risk. Moving forward, we
believe more effective protections are needed to defend users
against spoofing and phishing attacks.
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APPENDIX A – SPF/DMARC ADOPTION
We examine the adoption rate of SPF and DMARC by
crawling the DNS record for Alexa top 1 million hosts.
Table X shows statistics for January 2017.
TABLE X
SPF/DMARC STATISTICS OF ALEXA 1 MILLION DOMAINS.
Status All Domains # (%) MX Domains # (%)
Total domains 1,000,000 (100%) 818,682 (100%)
w/ SPF 477,484 (47.7%) 461,402 (56.4%)
w/ valid SPF 433,640 (43.4%) 418,284 (51.1%)
Policy: soft fail 268,886 (26.9%) 264,185 (32.3%)
Policy: hard fail 110,225 (11.0%) 100,665 (12.3%)
Policy: neutral 53,218 (5.3%) 52,150 (6.4%)
Policy: pass 1,311 (0.1%) 1,284 (0.2%)
w/ DMARC 30,996 (3.1%) 29,681 (3.6%)
w/ valid DMARC 30,594 (3.1%) 29,310 (3.6%)
Policy: none 23,336 (2.3%) 22,728 (2.8%)
Policy: reject 4,199 (0.4%) 3,581 (0.4%)
Policy: quarantine 3,059 (0.3%) 3,001 (0.4%)
TABLE XI
SHADOW EXPERIMENT DOMAIN LIST.
No SPF/DKIM/DMARC (20)
careerride.com, gmw.cn, sunrise.ch, office.com, thepiratebay.org,
onlinesbi.com, thewhizmarketing.com, askcom.me, putlockers.ch,
spotscenered.info, twimg.com, thewhizproducts.com, reddituploads.com,
codeonclick.com, ltn.com.tw, 4dsply.com, mysagagame.com,
ablogica.com, sh.st, mixplugin.com
SPF/DKIM;DMARC=none (20)
tumblr.com, wikipedia.org, ebay.com, msn.com, imgur.com, apple.com,
github.com, microsoftonline.com, coccoc.com, adf.ly, alibaba.com,
bbc.co.uk, rakuten.co.jp, rakuten.co.jp, vimeo.com, nytimes.com,
espn.com, salesforce.com, godaddy.com, indiatimes.com, weather.com
SPF/DKIM;DMARC=reject (20)
youtube.com, google.com, pinterest.com, vk.com, twitter.com,
instagram.com, reddit.com, linkedin.com, blogspot.com, microsoft.com,
ok.ru, stackoverflow.com, netflix.com, paypal.com, twitch.tv, adobe.com,
dropbox.com, whatsapp.com, booking.com, stackexchange.com
(a) Google Inbox profile photo (same-domain spoofing)
(b) Seznam profile photo (same-domain spoofing)
(c) Zoho profile photo and email history (spoofing a
contact)
Fig. 9. Examples of misleading UIs (profile photo, email history, namecard).
APPENDIX B – SHADOW EXPERIMENT
Table XI lists the 60 domains used by the end-to-end
spoofing experiment (shadow experiment). The domains per
category are selected from Alexa top 2000 domains.
APPENDIX C – MISLEADING USER INTERFACE
Figure 9 shows three examples of misleading UI elements.
Figure 9(a) and 9(b) show that when an attacker spoofs
a user from the same email provider as the receiver, the
email provider will automatically load the profile photo of
the spoofed sender from its internal database. In both Google
Inbox and Seznam, the forged emails look like that they were
sent by the user “Forged”, and the photo icon gives the forged
email a more authentic look.
Figure 9(c) demonstrates the misleading UIs when the at-
tacker spoofs an existing contact of the receiver. Again, despite
the sender address (contact@xxx.edu) is spoofed, Zoho
still loads the contact’s photo from its internal database. In
addition, users can check the recent email conversations with
this contact by clicking on the highlighted link. These elements
make the forged email look authentic. The profile photos used
the examples are not from the authors, but we received the
permission from the photo owner. Eyes are obscured for the
paper submission.
APPENDIX D – PHISHING EMAIL SCREENSHOTS
Figure 10 shows the example phishing email used in our
user studies (for both study 1 and study 2). The email content
is P-Curiosity. These are screenshots taken from the inbox
of Yahoo Mail, reflecting what the participants saw in the
phishing experiments.
(a) Without Security Cue
(b) With Security Cue
Fig. 10. The phishing email screenshot.
